SAIPAR Case Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 May 2021

Article 4

5-2021

Enock Kahale & 3 Others v The People [2021] ZMCA 26
John Hatchard
University of Buckingham (Emeritus)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr
Part of the African Studies Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Hatchard, John (2021) "Enock Kahale & 3 Others v The People [2021] ZMCA 26," SAIPAR Case Review:
Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr/vol4/iss1/4

This Case Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in SAIPAR Case Review by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

John Hatchard

Enock Kahale & 3 Others v The People [2021] ZMCA 26
Professor John Hatchard
Facts
In both criminal and civil cases, the general rule is that a witness may only testify as to matters
of fact of which they have personal knowledge. Thus, a witness may not draw inferences from
the facts, speculate about the causes of the facts or make value judgments about those facts:
see, for example, Mwelwa v The People [1975] ZR 166. In some cases, issues for determination
may fall outside the expertise of the court and accordingly opinions on that issue may be
received from witnesses who are experts in the relevant field.
The importance of ensuring that courts adopt the appropriate approach to dealing with expert
opinion evidence is highlighted in Enock Kahale & 3 Others v The People [2021] ZMCA 26.
Here the two appellants were convicted of murder, the victim having died of shotgun injuries
(the 3rd and 4th accused were acquitted). A ballistics expert compiled a report on the shotgun
but did not give evidence at the trial. Instead, the report was tendered by PW7, the investigating
police officer. PW7 also testified that he found shoe prints at the scene of the crime and traced
them some 500 metres to the house of the 4th accused. Here he found a pair of black and white
takkies which had been left by the 1st appellant. He testified that the shoe prints leading from
the crime scene ‘resembled the soles of the takkies’. The shoes were not produced in evidence
and there were no photographs taken. The 1st appellant testified that at the time of the attack he
was attending a football tournament. The trial court found that his alibi was ‘defeated’ by the
presence of his shoes at the house of the 4th accused.
Significance
The case highlights three key questions concerning the approach to expert opinion evidence
and the importance that legal practitioners and trial judges understand and address them fully.
1. Was expert opinion evidence properly adduced?
2. Did the court require assistance in considering the evidence?
3. Was the witness qualified to give evidence as an ‘expert’?
1. Was expert opinion evidence properly adduced?
There are three areas of concern here. Firstly, the shotgun evidence: It was established that the
2nd appellant owned a shotgun and he and the 1st appellant were seen in the vicinity of the crime
scene. However, the ballistics report did not expressly state that the pellets retrieved from the
body of the victim were discharged from that shotgun. The trial court held that this did not
‘exclude the possibility that the pellets were discharged from that firearm’. It is not clear as to
how this finding satisfies the burden of proving to the criminal standard that the fatal shot was
fired from the 2nd appellant’s shotgun.
The Court of Appeal was not required to address this point as the prosecution had failed to call
the ballistics expert to produce their report. This is a mandatory requirement under section 4(1)
of the Evidence Act (Cap 43) unless the maker is unavailable for a specified reason. No such
reason was advanced by the prosecution. The Court of Appeal rightly held that the production
of the report was contrary to the provisions of section 4, notwithstanding that there was no
objection to it, and ought not to have been admitted at the trial. As a result, no reliance was
placed upon it.
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It was left to the court to find an ‘odd coincidence that the deceased was shot a few minutes
after the appellants were seen headed towards the crime scene and the 2nd appellant owned a
shotgun’. Again, it is hard to see how this proves to the criminal standard that this particular
shotgun caused the death of the victim.
Secondly, the lack of fingerprint evidence: The matching of fingerprints is weighty evidence
and a conviction can be upheld when there is no other evidence of identity. As counsel for the
defence argued, the expert could have lifted fingerprints from the shotgun to ascertain the true
identity of the shooter. This was not done, and no explanation was provided for this omission.
This crucial point was not considered by the Court of Appeal.
Thirdly: the shoe prints evidence: Real evidence can enable the court to draw appropriate
inferences from their condition or existence. Yet in Kahale the shoes in question were not
produced in evidence and no pictures of the shoe prints were taken. It is unclear as to why the
prosecution failed to address this issue or why this was not explored by the trial court or the
Court of Appeal.
2. Did the court require expert assistance in considering the evidence?
The test is set out in R v Luttrell [2004] EWCA Crim 1344:
The question is … whether or not the subject matter of the opinion is such that a person
without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience would
be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance of witnesses
possessing special knowledge or experience in the area (at para 32).
This is a question of fact. For example, in Njunga & others v The People [1988/89] ZR 1 the
Supreme Court emphasised that it is not necessary in all cases for expert medical evidence to
be called to support a conviction for causing death: ‘Except in borderline cases, laymen are
quite capable of giving evidence that a person has died.’
In Kahale the position was very different. Here PW7 testified that ‘when he compared the prints
to the sole of the appellant's takkies, they resembled.’ The crucial issue in the case was whether
the shoe prints matched those of the shoes found in the house. Applying the test in Luttrell this
required the court to be provided with a suitable scientific analysis and comparison to form a
sound judgment on the matter. This was not done. Further, as noted earlier, the shoes were not
produced in evidence and no pictures of the shoe prints were taken. Even so, the Court of
Appeal held that ‘the lower court rightly found PW7's evidence, in this regard, to be credible.’
This is disappointing. Just as with fingerprints and ear prints, a scientific comparison of the
shoes’ prints with the shoe was essential to determine whether the two matched and this was
an issue which the court required the assistance of someone with special knowledge or
experience in the area. Simply accepting that they ‘resembled’ and that the evidence of PW7
was ‘credible’ is quite unsatisfactory. Such matters must be strictly proved and arguably, this
was not the case here.
This leads to the question as to whether, in any event, PW7 had the expertise to provide an
expert opinion regarding the shoes.
3. Was the witness qualified to give evidence as an ‘expert’?
In Mwelwa v The People [1975] ZR 166 BARON DCJ asserted that ‘It is quite clear that
witnesses who do not qualify as experts should not be permitted to give their opinion on the
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very issues which the court is called upon to decide.’ Whether a witness qualifies as an ‘expert’
depends upon their professional qualifications and/or their experience. For example, in Chileya
v The People (1981, unreported) the applicant was convicted of the theft of a Toyota motor
vehicle. He sought leave to appeal and argued that the evidence of a prosecution witness
concerning the make and chassis of the vehicle was inadmissible as the witness was not an
‘expert’ as he referred to himself as the General Manager of a company dealing with motor
vehicles and that his job concerned accountancy. GARDNER Ag DCJ noted that ‘the witness
had been dealing with Toyota motor vehicles for some years and was familiar with their
different makes. In the circumstances this qualified the witness to give the relevant evidence’.
In Kahale, PW7 testified as to the shoe prints leading to the house of the 4th appellant. This was
admissible as he was simply providing factual evidence. However, no evidence was tendered
(and none was required by the court) to demonstrate that PW7 had any experience or training
in making a comparison between the shoes and the prints. Accordingly, he could not be
classified as an ‘expert’. Applying Mwelwa, arguably he was not permitted to give his opinion
on the very issue which the court was called upon to decide, i.e., whether the shoes’ prints
matched the shoes found in the house.
Conclusion
The case of Kahale is unusual in that the expert who was required to give evidence, i.e., the
ballistics expert, did not do so whilst PW7, a non-expert, was permitted to give evidence that
required an expert in the relevant field. There was therefore a complete absence of expert
opinion evidence and yet this was of critical importance to the case. This involved a number of
significant failures:
• Failure to prove that the pellets found in the body of the deceased came from the gun
of the 2nd appellant
• Failure to call the ballistics expert to give evidence regarding his report
• Failure to lift fingerprints from the murder weapon
• Failure to provide the shoes or any appropriate photographic evidence to the trial court
Further, a non-expert was permitted to give expert testimony.
In cases, especially those which rest entirely on circumstantial evidence as was the case here,
expert opinion evidence is often crucial. Without it, it is difficult for a court to convict without
resorting to the finding of ‘odd coincidences’, ‘credibility’ and the like. It is essential that in
all cases, the three questions noted above are each dealt with appropriately.
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